The Right of Civil Resistance Under International Law and the Domestic Necessity Defense by Lippman, Matthew
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 8
Number 3 Dickinson Journal of International Law Article 2
1990
The Right of Civil Resistance Under International
Law and the Domestic Necessity Defense
Matthew Lippman
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lippman, Matthew (1990) "The Right of Civil Resistance Under International Law and the Domestic Necessity Defense," Penn State
International Law Review: Vol. 8: No. 3, Article 2.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol8/iss3/2
The Right of Civil Resistance Under
International Law and the Domestic
Necessity Defense
Matthew Lippman*
Morality, if it survives, could protect us from horror, but very
little protects morality. And morality, besides, is hard to protect,
because morality is only a few thoughts in our heads. And just
as we quickly grow accustomed to brutal deeds and make way
before them, so we are quickly stunned into foggy submissions
by the brutal thoughts which, in our striving for comfort, we
have allowed into our minds and which can snuff the life out of
morality in a matter of moments if we happen to look the other
way. And all the time we are operating under the illusion that
we, mere individuals, have no power at all over the course of
history, when that is in fact (for better or worse) the very oppo-
site of the case.'
In a 1975 article, Professor Richard Falk argues that "we are
undergoing a major reorganization of international life at the present
time which will result in drastic modification of the world order sys-
tem that has prevailed since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648."' Al-
though he recognizes the possibility of global extinction, Falk sug-
gests that there is "a positive option premised upon an affirmation of
the wholeness of the planet and the solidarity of the human species
that could bring about a rearrangement of the power, wealth, and
authority that would be more beneficial than anything the world has
heretofore known."" Falk suggests that this new global order will be
based on the primacy of the individual and will stress human rights,
self-determination, ecological balance, and peace." He predicts that
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I. W. SHAWN, On the Context of the Play, in AUNT DAN AND LEMON 89. 102 (1985).
2. Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies Prospects and Proposals, 84
YALE L.J. 969 (1975).
3. Id. at 973.
4. Id.
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initially this global reform movement will take shape outside of and
in opposition to the traditional centers of state power and will be
"populist and antigovernmental in character and origin."' Falk urges
international lawyers to turn their attention to facilitating the reali-
zation of this new global order rather then being content with clari-
fying "the rights and duties of the various passengers on the plane-
tary cruiseship Titanic. '"6
The contemporary development of popular civil disobedience
campaigns directed towards the modification or overthrow of repres-
sive regimes is one of the most significant steps in the development of
Falk's new humanistic world order. It is an implicit affirmation that
individual human rights are independent of and transcend the limita-
tions prescribed by a State's domestic legal systems.7 Writing in
1989, Richard Falk points to manifestations of this new movement in-
China, Poland, the Soviet Union, the Philippines, Chile, South Ko-
rea, and Palestine. 8 He concludes that:
[this] new revolutionary movement could be the most significant
political development of the postwar era aside from the
decolonization movement in Africa and Asia. It discloses the
possibility of effectively defying repressive state power, and do-
ing so without causing a bloodbath or deep resentments that
lead inevitably to a cycle of one repressive elite succeeded by
another.9
The essay argues that the international community should rec-
ognize a right of nonviolent resistance for those engaged in limited,
proportionate actions in defense of fundamental human rights. Such
individuals are acting in the nature of private attorneys general who
are vindicating the inherent and inalienable international human
rights of all individuals in those instances in which the international
community has been unwilling or unable to institute democratic re-
forms. It would be a tragic irony if international law did not specifi-
cally protect individuals who are non-violently protesting the often
criminal conduct of the very regimes which sanction and repress
5. Id.
6. Id. at 992.
7. Classical international law viewed the individual as only possessing those rights which
were granted to them by their domestic legal system. The human rights revolution established
a number of internationally recognized human rights, but individuals' enjoyment of those
rights remains dependent upon the incorporation of these rights into domestic legal systems.
See Lippman, Human Rights Revisited: The Protection of Human Rights Under the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 450, 474-76, 500-02
(1980). See also Lippman, The Debate Over A Bill of Rights in Great Britain: The View from
Parliament, 2 HUM. RTs. Q. 25 (1980); Lippman, The Abrogation of Domestic Human
Rights: Northern Ireland and the Rule of British Law, in TERRORISM IN EUROPE 181 (Y.
Alexander & K.A. Myers eds. 1982).
8. Falk, People Power, 248 THE NATION 801 (June 12, 1989).
9. Id.
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these protesters in retaliation for exposing the regimes' violations of
human rights.10 Richard Falk writes that:
[because] governments have relinquished their responsibilities to
humanity, it has become more important than ever for the peo-
ples of the world to assert . . .what no important leaders in
positions of active authority want to affirm: many governments
are engaged through the agency of their leaders in committing
severe crimes of state. Further, these crimes of state are impos-
ing terrible suffering in all parts of the world .
I. The Moral Imperative to Protest
The French existentialists confronted the problem of evil and
the extinction of independent France during the Nazi occupation.
Jean-Paul Sartre, in his 1950 novel, Troubled Sleep," writes "now
France is lying on her back, and we can take a good look at her, we
can see her like a large broken-down piece of machinery, and we
think: That is it-it was an accident of geography, an accident of
history."" a
Albert Camus, in The Plague,'4 written in 1947, utilized the
metaphor of a plague of disease-ridden rats which mysteriously de-
scend on a small town to convey the evil which impregnated France
during the German occupation. The plague ravages the town, the
gates are sealed and its inhabitants are separated from the outside
world.1 In the town, people
had fallen into line, adapted themselves as people say, to the
situation, because there was no way of doing otherwise. Natu-
rally they retained the attitudes of sadness and suffering, but
they had ceased to feel the sting . . You could see them at
street corners, in cafes, or friends' houses, listless, indifferent,
and looking so bored that, because of them, the whole town
seemed like a railway waiting-room. Those who had jobs went
about them at the exact tempo of the plague, with dreary.
perseverance."6
In The Rebel,'7 Camus argues that individuals must rebel and
10. See generally Lippman, Civil Disobedience: The Dictates of Conscience Versus The
Rule of Law, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 233 (1987); Lippman, Nuremberg, 6 LAw IN CONTEXT 20,
39-42 (1988); Lippman, First Strike Nuclear Weapons and the Justifiability of Civil Resis-
tance Under International Law, 2 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 155 (1989); Lippman, Reflections
on Non- Violent Resistance and the Necessity Defense, II Hous. J. INT'L L. 227 (1989).
II. R. FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW 222 (1989).
12. J. SARTRE, TROUBLED SLEEP (G. Hokins trans. 1950).
13. Id. at 53.
14. A. CAMus, THE PLAGUE (S. Gilbert trans. 1947) [hereinafter THE PLAGUE].
15. Id.
16. Id. at 170-71.
17. A. CAMUS, THE REBEL: AN ESSAY ON MAN IN REVOLT (A. Bower Trans. 1956)
Spring 1990]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
affirm that injustice will not remain unchallenged.' "Crushed be-
tween human evil and destiny, between terror and the arbitrary, all
that remains . . . is his power to rebel ... ."19 Rebellion also in-
sures that the human personality will not become desensitized and
lose its sense of outrage over inhumanitarian behavior. Rebellion,
"though apparently negative, since it creates nothing, is profoundly
positive in that it reveals the part of man which must always be
defended."2 0
The rebel thus asserts that justice is so central that he or she is
willing to die rather than to witness its abrogation or compromise.2'
In this sense, the rebel's act of individual rebellion is undertaken in
defense of justice for all peoples.
[It] is for the sake of everyone in the world that the slave asserts
himself when he comes to the conclusion that a command has
infringed on something in him which does not belong to him
alone, but which is common ground where all men - even the
man who insults and oppresses him - have a natural
community.
For Camus, the individual must continually resist being drawn into
complicity with evil. In The Plague, Tarrou, one of the protagonists,
remarks in the context of a lengthy exegesis on evil that:
on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and it's
up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestilencei
... . we should add a third category: that of the true healers.
But it's a face one doesn't come across many of them, and any-
how it must be a hard vocation. That's why I decided to take, in
every predicament, the victim's side, so as to reduce the damage
done. Among them I can at least try to discover how one attains
to the third category. In other words, to peace. 3
Camus' rebellion is a nonviolent struggle. He writes that rebel-
lion, when it is accompanied by destruction and violence, is "illogi-
cal."' 2' The logic of the rebel "is not the logic of destruction; it is the
logic of creation. '25 The "logic of the rebel is to want to serve justice
so as not to add to the injustice of the human condition . . . . The
consequences of rebellion . . . is to refuse to legitimize murder be-
[hereinafter THE REBEL].
18. Camus, Beyond Nihilism, in THE REBEL, supra note 17, at 302, 303-04.
19. Id. at 304.
20. Camus, The Rebel, in THE REBEL, supra note 17, at 13, 19.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 16.
23. THE PLAGUE, supra note 14, at 236-37.
24. Camus, Thought at the Meridian, in THE REBEL, supra note 17, at 279, 285.
25. Id.
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cause rebellion, in principle, is a protest against death.""6
In a 1946 essay, Camus envisioned the possibility that individu-
als across the globe would coalesce into a transnational movement
dedicated to a new social contract and global order. He observed
that:
little is to be expected from present-day governments, since
these live and act according to a murderous code. Hope remains
only in the most difficult task of all: to reconsider everything
from the group up, so as to shape a living society inside a dying
society. Men must therefore, as individuals, draw up among
themselves, within frontiers and across them, a new social con-
tract which will unite them according to more reasonable
principles.27
II. Towards an Ethic of Solidarity and Nonviolent Resistance
The 1988 report of the Independent Commission On Interna-
tional Humanitarian Issues calls for "an ethic of human solidarity ' 2 8
and a "universal moral perspective" 2 9 which entails "an almost Co-
pernican change of perspective, from a fractured to a holistic view of
human welfare which is centered on the commonality of human in-
terests"30 and "collective action" 3' to achieve global justice."2 This
call is a recognition that both domestic and international mecha-
nisms for the protection of human rights and dignity often are slow,
costly and ineffective8" and individuals must resort to self-help.' 4
In March 1981, the United Nations Educational, Social and
Cultural Organization convened a conference of experts in Freetown,
Sierre Leone to consider the individual and collective right of resis-
tance against government violations of human rights. 35 The Final
Report of the meeting of experts'6 observes that while the right to
resist government oppression historically has been based on natural
or divine law, today it is based upon the protection of universally
26. Id.
27. A. CAMUS, NEITHER VICTIMS NOR EXECUTIONERS 49 (D. Macdonald trans. 1986).
28, INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, WINNING
THE HUMAN RACE? THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL Hu-
MANITARIAN ISSUES 4 (1988). The commission is an independent body of eminent persons
which studies global humanitarian issues and reports its findings to the United Nations.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See generally H. TOLLEY. THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1987).
34. Transnational citizen reform movements are a growing contemporary phenomena.
See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, supra note 28, at
28.
35. UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENCE AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, VIOLA-
TIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS POSSIBLE RIGHTS OF RECOURSE AND FORMS OF RESISTANCE (1984).
36. Id. at 221.
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recognized human rights.3 7 Respect for human rights, in fact, "con-
stitutes at once the aim and the justification for such resistance" 8
and "the notion of a right to resist violations of human rights is in-
separable from human rights."3 9
According to the experts, the right to resist is not only based on
human rights, but must be exercised in a fashion which is consistent
with the requirements of human rights instruments.40 The means of
resistance must be proportionate to the gravity of the human rights
which are being violated;4 and violent resistance may only be relied
upon as a last resort in extreme situations after all nonviolent means
of resistance have been exhausted.42 Such extreme situations include
colonialism, genocide, and apartheid.43 Since there is an imbalance
of power between protesters and the government, the experts urge
the international community to consider how it might assist individu-
als exercising the right of resistance. 4
Those exercising various forms of nonviolent protest and resis-
tance often are subjected to severe formal and informal penalties.
There is little reliable data, but some insight into the scope of such
repression is revealed by examining some of the information com-
piled by Amnesty International. 45  Amnesty's data indicates that
those imprisoned for nonviolent protest activities include: students
speaking out against educational' and governmental policies; 7 those
engaged in anti-governmental demonstrations;48 workers engaged in
union activity;49 peasants involved in land disputes;50 and those dis-
tributing leaflets critical of regimes.51 In other cases, demonstrators
have been subjected to excessive force and violence.52
37. Id. at 221, 227.
38. Id. at 226.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 223.
42. Id. at 226.
43. Id. at 223.
44. Id. at 226.
45. Amnesty International is a human rights group which works on behalf of prisoners
of conscience around the world-those detained or imprisoned due to their political, religious
or other conscientiously held beliefs or by reason of their ethnic origin, sex, color or language,
provided that they have not used or advocated violence. See STATUTE OF AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL, in LARSON, A FLAME IN BARBED WIRE: THE STORY OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
(1979); J. POWER, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: THE HUMAN RIGHTS STORY (1981).
46. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INT'L REP. 1988, at 23 (1988) (Benin).
47. Id. at 141 (Venezuela); Id. at 51 (Madagascar).
48. Id. at 76 (Sudan); Id. at 154, 156 (China); Id. at 166 (South Korea); Id. at 149
(Bangladesh).
49. Id. at 96 (Bolivia)' Id. at 101 (Chile).
50. Id. at 123 (Mexico); Id. at 130-31 (Paraguay).
51. Id. at 195 (Bulgaria); Id. at 255 (Tunisia).
52. Id. at 129 (Panama).
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III. An International Legal Right of Nonviolent Resistance
The great eighteenth century social contract theorists who in-
spired modern democratic constitutionalism recognized the collective
right of popular revolution against tyrannical regimes. John Locke53
writes that self-defense is "a part of the law of Nature"54 and if the
king "sets himself against the body of the commonwealth . . . and
shall, with intolerable ill-usage, cruelly tyrannize over the whole, or
a considerable part of the people; in this case the people have a right
"955to resist and defend themselves from injury ....
Jean-Jacques Rosseau 56 contended that when the prince ceases
to administer the state according to the law and usurps the sovereign
power,
the state as a whole is dissolved and another is formed inside it,
one composed only of members of the government and having no
significance for the rest of the people except that of a master
and a tyrant. Now, at the moment the government usurps sover-
eignty, the social pact is broken, and all the ordinary citizens,
recovering by right their natural freedom, are compelled by
force, but not morally obliged to obey.5"
The right to rebel against illegitimate governmental authority
was incorporated into the documents which form the early founda-
tion for the contemporary human rights revolution. The United
States Declaration of Independence 8 recognizes that "all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness."59 The Declaration goes on to state that governments
derive their rights from the consent of the governed and are formed
so as to secure these rights."0 Whenever a government becomes "de-
structive of these ends,""1 the Declaration asserts that it is the right
of the people "to alter or abolish it,'"62 and to institute a new govern-
ment based on the principles which "they believe are likely to secure
their happiness and safety."6"
The Declaration of Independence emphasizes that the overthrow
53. J. Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil Government, in JOHN LOCKE ON POLITICS
AND EDUCATION 71 (H.R. Penniman ed. 1947).
54. Id. at 196.
55. Id.
56. J.J. ROSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (M. Cranston trans. 1968).
57. Id. at 133.
58. THE UNITED STATES DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776), in THE HUMAN
RIGHTS READER 106 (W. Laqueur & B. Rubin ed. 1979).
59. Id. at 107.
60. Id.
61. id.
62. Id.63. Id.
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of a regime is not to be undertaken for minor or transient causes, but
is appropriate when a series of abuses indicates an intent to subject
individuals to "absolute despotism '"64 and all other avenues of re-
dress have been exhausted. 5 Central to the colonists' grievances was
what they argued was a lack of democratic control over the execu-
tive"6 and legislative branches 67 of government and an undermining
of the independence of the judiciary. 8
The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens of
1789,9 the other document which anticipated the contemporary
human rights movement, sets forth "the natural, inalienable and sa-
cred rights of man."170 The Declaration of the Rights of Man asserts
that the aim of every political association is the preservation of the
"natural and inalienable rights of man. ' '7' These rights include lib-
erty, property, security and, most importantly, resistance to oppres-
sion.72 The source of all sovereignty resides in the nation73 and any
society in which the guarantee of rights is not assured or the separa-
tion of powers is not provided for "has no constitution at all."74
The American and French Declarations, with their concern for
popular sovereignty, human rights, and resistance to arbitrary au-
thority and to governments which fail to respect civil and political
liberties laid the foundation for modern democratic thought. The
right of popular revolution, in particular, captured the popular imag-
ination. Various early American state constitutions explicitly recog-
nized a right to rebel against a government which disregards the will
of the people.75 Article Ten of the New Hampshire Constitution of
1797 stated that "whenever the ends of government are perverted,
and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of re-
dress are ineffectual, the doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary
power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good
and happiness of mankind. '76 Justice Hugo Black, writing in 1960,
64. Id.
65. Id. at 109.
66. Id. at 107-8.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 108.
69. THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN (1789), in THE
HUMAN RIGHTS READER, supra note 58, at 118.
70. Id. at Preamble.
71. Id. at 118, para. 2.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 119, para. 3.
74. Id. at 120, para. 16.
75. Paust, The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related Forms of
Social Violence: Testing the Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY L.J. 545, 546 n.4 (1983)
[hereinafter Testing the Limits].
76. N.H. CONST. art. 10 (1797), reprinted in THE TREE OF LIBERTY: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF REBELLION AND POLITICAL CRIME IN AMERICA 85 (N.H. Kittrie & E.D. Wedlock
Jr. eds. 1986).
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observed that the right of revolution was deeply embedded in the
American political culture.
The men who founded this country and wrote our Bill of Rights
were strangers neither to a belief in the "right of revolution" nor
to the urgency of the need to be free from the control of govern-
ment with regard to political beliefs and associations. Thomas
Jefferson was not disclaiming a belief in the "right of revolu-
tion" when he wrote the Declaration of Independence. And Pat-
rick Henry was certainly not disclaiming such a belief when he
declared in impassioned words that have come on down through
the years: "Give me liberty or give me death." The country's
freedom was won by men who, whether they believed in it or
not, certainly practiced revolution in the Revolutionary war.
Since the beginning of history there have been governments that
have engaged in practices against the people so bad, so cruel, so
unjust and so destructive of the individual dignity of men and
women that the "right of revolution" was all the people had left
to free themselves . . . .I venture the suggestion that there are
countless multitudes in this country, and all over the world, who
would join ...in the right of the people to resist by force ty-
rannical governments.7
In the twentieth century, the principles of popular sovereignty,
human rights and the right to rebellion were extended to the interna-
tional community. The preamble to the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights78 recognizes the inherent dignity and the equal
and inalienable rights of all "members of the human family."7 9 The
preamble explicitly links the provision of human rights to the right
of popular rebellion by providing that "it is essential, if man is not to
be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by
the rule of law." 80
The instruments which served as a foundation for human rights
clearly mandate a democratic government in which ultimate sover-
eignty is vested in the people. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights that the "will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of the government ..."" All individuals have the right to take part
in the government of their country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;82 and everyone has the right of equal access to the
77. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 112-13 (1960).
78. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217(11 I),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 7 (1948).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at art. 21(3).
82. Id. at art. 21(l).
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public service of their country.8" The Universal Declaration also pro-
vides for periodic and genuine elections which shall be conducted
with universal and equal suffrage by secret ballot.84 The Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights85 includes a similar
provision8" and, along with the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,8" recognizes that all peoples have the
right of self-determination and by virtue of that right they may
freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, so-
cial, and cultural development.88
The protection of human rights is a limitation on the sover-
eignty of States. Signatory States are obligated to respect and to
ensure the rights enumerated in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. 89 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides that everyone is entitled to a social and international order
in which the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Declaration can
be fully realized."0 The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provides that no State, group, or person has a right to engage
in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any
of the rights and freedoms recognized in the Covenant,9" or possesses
the right to limit the rights to a greater extent than is provided for in
the Covenant.92
Human rights treaties, consistent with their purpose, should be
interpreted broadly, 3 and arguably impose duties and obligations on
individuals as well as Nation-States to protect human rights. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights imposes a duty on individu-
als to "act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." '94 The
83. Id. at art. 21(2).
84. Id. at art. 21(3).
85. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res 2200(XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (opened for signature, Dec. 19, 1966;
entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976) (signed by the United States, Dec. 31, 1979).
86. Id. at art. 25.
87. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (opened for signa-
ture, Dec. 19, 1966; entered into force, Jan. 3, 1976) (signed by the United States, Dec. 31,
1979).
88. Id. at art 1(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 85,
at art. I. See also Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514(XV), 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1961). Those living in colonial and racist regimes have a recognized right to struggle against
the denial of self-determination. See Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res.
3314(XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9613 (1975), art. 7.
89. Id. at art. 2(I).
90. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 78, at art. 5(l).
91. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 85, at art. 5(1).
92. Id. at art. 5(2).
93. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 29/27,
at 289 (1969) (done at Vienna, May 22, 1969); (opened for signature, May 23, 1969).
94. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 78, at art. 1; see also id. at art.
29(l).
[Vol. 8:3
RIGHT OF CIVIL RESISTANCE
preambles to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, inter alia, provide that "the individual, having du-
ties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs,
is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant. '95 The Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Peoples,9" adopted by an international
conference of jurists, politicians, sociologists, and economists meeting
in July 1976 in Algiers, provides in article 30 that the "re-establish-
ment of fundamental rights of peoples, when they are seriously disre-
garded, is a duty incumbent upon all members of the international
community." '97 Professor Jordan Paust concludes that:
In response to governmental oppression of authority, the people
of a given community have the right under international law to
alter, abolish or overthrow any such form of government. Such a
government would lack authority and could be overthrown in an
effort to ensure authoritative government, self-determination,
and the human right to relatively free and equal individual par-
ticipation in the political process. A regime contrary to the au-
thority of the people is actually an illegal regime seeking to ex-
ercise power in violation of several interrelated international
precepts. Hence, it has no right under international law to as-
sure its survival. 98
Thus, human rights instruments, when interpreted in light of
their humanitarian purpose, establish, at a minimum, a legal privi-
lege for individuals to act in a nonviolent, proportionate fashion to
protest and to attempt to prevent a regime's continued violation of
international human rights. The notion that those acting in defense
of human rights should be insulated from criminal liability under
international law draws its inspiration from the fact that interna-
tional law generally recognizes a political offender exception to ex-
tradition. There is no single test for determining political offender
status; however, virtually all States refuse to extradite political of-
fenders, however defined, to requesting States.99
There are a variety of rationales for the political offense exemp-
95. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 85; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 87.
96. Universal Declaration Of The Rights Of Peoples, in I TOWARD A JUST WORLD
ORDER 432 (R. Falk, S. Kim & S. Mendlovitz eds. 1982).,
97. Id. art. 30, at 434.
98. Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide And
Other Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 EMORY L.J. 283, 297-98 (1986). See also Testing
the Limits, supra note 75.
99. See Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender Exception in Extradition Treaties
in Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. J. INT'L L. 61 (1979); Larschan, Extradition,
The Political Offense Exception and Terrorism: An Overview of the Three Principal Theories
of Law, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 231 (1986).
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tion, but it primarily serves as a recognition that there is a right of
rebellion against government authority.' It has been observed that
"'the exception comports with the widespread acceptance of the in-
dividual's right to resort to political activism to foster change.' "101
As a result, it is believed that political offenders should be distin-
guished from common criminals and should not be extradited for
trial."0 2
The Swiss "predominance test" distinguishes political offenses
based upon the motive of the offender. 03 In Ktir v. Ministere Public
Federal,10 4 the Swiss tribunal ruled that political offenses include or-
dinary crimes which have a "predominantly political character...
as a result of the motives inspiring them and the purpose sought to
be achieved."' 0 5 An additional requirement is that "the damage
caused be proportionate to the result sought . . . [while] the inter-
ests at stake should be sufficiently important to excuse, if not to jus-
tify, the infringement of private legal rights."'' 0
Professor Cherif Bassiouni has extended the Swiss "predomi-
nance test" and has argued for a right of "ideological self-preserva-
tion" or "political self-defense' 10 7 for political offenders acting with
the motive of protecting human rights.
The primary consideration in the law of self-defense is a value-
judgment based on the inherent justification of self-preservation
. . . if fundamental human rights are seriously violated by an
institutional entity or a person or persons wielding the authority
of the state and acting on its behalf without lawful means of
redress or remedy being made available, then the responsibility
of the individual, whose conduct was necessitated by the original
transgression by reason of his need to redress a continuing
wrong, is justified or mitigated and, therefore, warrants a denial
of extradition." 8
A State clearly exceeds its sovereign prerogatives when it vio-
lates individuals' inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights,
100. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986).
101. Id. (quoting Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism: The Politics of Ex-
tradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 622 (1981)).
102. Id.
103. Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition
and Asylum, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 371, 378-79 (1953).
104. Ktir v. Ministere Public Federal, 34 I.L.R. 143 (Tribune Federale, Suisse 1961)
(political offender status denied in the case of a French national who was a member of the
Algerian Liberation Movement who murdered another member of the movement who was
suspected of collaboration with the French government).
105. Id. at 144 (emphasis in original).
106. Id.
107. Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exemption
in Extradition-A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem, 10 DEPAUL L. REV.
217, 255 (1969) [hereinafter Bassiouni].
108. Id.
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and then criminally prosecutes those who protest such violations. It
may be no longer contended that such prosecutions fall within a
State's domestic jurisdiction and are insulated from the requirements
of international law.' 09 Under contemporary international human
rights laws, the Third Reich clearly would not have been justified in
criminally prosecuting those who blocked death trains or attempted
to protest forced labor programs.
The law of self-defense recognizes that individuals may act to
defend their inherent right to physical integrity and life." 0 A right
of nonviolent, proportionate action to defend those inalienable rights
enumerated in international human rights instruments should also be
established. Accordingly, an international declaration on the right to
act in defense of human rights should be drafted.
Absent action by international organizations, this declaration
should be formulated and drafted by an international assembly of
private individuals. The declaration should specify that all persons
are entitled to the exercise and enjoyment of the rights recognized in
human rights instruments. Individuals should be recognized as being
entitled to resort to nonviolent, proportionate acts in violation of do-
mestic criminal law which are motivated by a desire to protect inter-
nationally guaranteed human rights. These acts may either be
designed to protect the rights of those engaged in civil resistance or
of those who are not present.
Acts of nonviolent resistance, to the extent possible, should be
directed against the appropriate governmental authorities and insti-
tutions, and protestors should avoid unnecessary disruption and
harm. The right to defend human rights only should be resorted to
after other legal avenues of redress have been exhausted, unless such
efforts would be futile. The claim that an act was undertaken and
motivated by a desire to protect human rights shall be available as a
defense in all criminal trials. Individuals who engage in acts of justi-
fiable civil resistance should be accorded protected status under in-
ternational law, and States should be prohibited from imprisoning,
harassing, discriminating against, or abusing such individuals. Those
who are imprisoned should be recognized as political prisoners under
international law, and all States, non-governmental organizations,
and individuals should pledge to work for their release.
It would be ingenuous to believe that such a declaration will
deter States from criminally prosecuting those engaged in nonviolent
protest or that it will result in their acquittal. However, it will accord
legitimacy to and encourage those who protest against violations of
109. D'Amato, The Relation of the Individual to the State in the State in the Era of
Human Rights, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 11 (1989).
110. Bassiouni, supra note 107.
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human rights and focus international attention on regimes which
prosecute those acting in defense of human rights. The declaration
also will formally recognize that individuals, as well as States, have a
duty to protect the internationally guaranteed human rights of all
peoples and will emphasize the unity of all members of the human
family.
In the United States, the first steps have been taken towards the
development of an international law defense for those engaged in
nonviolent resistance to human rights violations. In various cases, de-
fendants who have been arrested for nonviolent acts of protest
against United States foreign and nuclear policies have attempted to
rely upon the defense of necessity. These defendants argue that their
acts are necessary to protest and to halt ongoing violations of inter-
national human rights by the United States. The defendants also
claim that the harm stemming from their criminal acts is minor in
comparison to the harm caused by the United States' violations of
human rights and thus are justified under the necessity defense.'11
IV. International Law and American Courts
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by courts of justice of appropriate jurisdictions, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination.""' 2 International law, according to the Supreme
Court, "may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writ-
ings professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice
of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing the
law.""13 Where there are no controlling executive or legislative acts
or judicial decisions, international law may be determined by the
"customs and usages of civilized nations.""' A recognized "custom
and usage" must have the "general assent of civilized nations" in
order to insure that domestic courts will not "impose idiosyncratic
legal rules ...in the name of applying international law.""15
The Charter of the United Nations obligates Signatories to pro-
tect "human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
111. See Boyle, International Law, Citizen Resistance, And Crime By the State-The
Defense Speaks, I 1 Hous. J. INT'L L. 345 (1989).
112. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
113. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820); Lopes v. Schroe-
der, 225 F. Supp. 292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
114. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. See generally Statute of the International
Court of Justice, art. 38(I)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. no. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 U.N.Y.B.
1043 (done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945) (entered into force for the United States, Oct.
24, 1945).
115. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing the Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. at 694).
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tinction as to race, sex, language or religion.""'  The Charter does
not explicitly define human rights, but the conception is given defini-
tion by the provisions of various multilateral human rights instru-
ments." 7 American courts have recognized that, although the United
States is not a signatory to these treaties, they constitute customary
international law which is binding on the United States."' The State
Department has also recognized that "there now exists an interna-
tional consensus that recognizes basic human rights and obligations
owed by all governments to their citizens . . . . There is no doubt
that these rights are often violated; but virtually all governments ac-
knowledge their validity.""' 9
Those who have engaged in nonviolent acts of civil resistance
against government policies which they perceive to be in violation of
international law generally have been denied standing by appellate
courts to raise an international law defense. 2 ' In United States v.
Allen,' 2' the Second Circuit observed that "appellants should not be
excused from the criminal consequences of acts of civil disobedience
simply because the acts were allegedly directed at international law
violations."' 22 Other courts have ruled that in order to have standing
to raise an international law defense, the defendants must demon-
strate that they have suffered a specific, unique harm as a result of
the violation of international law.' In Pauling v. McElroy, I" the
Court denied the appellants standing to challenge a United States
nuclear test on the grounds that they failed to allege a specific,
threatened injury to themselves and merely had "set themselves up
as protestants, on behalf of all mankind, against the tests of nuclear
contamination in common with people generally."' 26
The judiciary has also consistently ruled that the political ques-
tion doctrine prevents courts from inquiring into the legality under
international law of foreign policy and defense matters. In Davi v.
116. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, Bevans 1153, 1976 U.N.Y.B.
1043 (done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945) (entered into force for the United States, Oct.
24, 1945); U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 13(b), 56, 62(2), 73(a) & (b).
117. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 78; Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 85; International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 87.
118. Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d at 879-84; see also Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.
Supp. 1177, 1187-89, 1192, 1193 nn. 18 & 19 (D. Conn. 1980) afrd in part, modified and
remanded in part, on other grounds, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505
F. Supp. 787, 795-98 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
119. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 884 (quoting HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS FOR 1979 at I (Jt. Comm. Print 1980)).
120. State v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 473-75, 509 P.2d 1095, 1110-11 (1973).
121. 760 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1985).
122. Id. at 453.
123. United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1980).
124. 331 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
125. Id. at 254.
Spring 1990]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Laird,'26 a United States District Court in Virginia refused to de-
clare that the United States military action in Vietnam and in
Southeast Asia was unconstitutional and declined to issue an injunc-
tion against the use of the plaintiffs' taxes to support such activities.
The Court held that:
the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that their claim may be
extricated from the political question rule. It involves precisely
the inquiry into principles and policy considerations which the
Constitution has committed to political branches, and with
which the judiciary is ill-suited to cope . . . . It is crystal clear
that if there is one political question in the fabric of government
of the Republic, it is whether or not to maintain a war, and if so,
whether to maintain it as an imperfect or declared war. Into this
seamless web of national and international politics, the courts
should not intrude.1 2 7
In the end, courts have ruled that to permit the public order to
be disrupted "under the aegis of international law would foment an
anarchical result. 1 2 8 There is no support for "the proposition that a
free and democratic society must excuse violation of its laws by
those seeking to conform their country's policies to international law.
Compliance with international law must be sought through the ballot
box, or, where appropriate, by court action." '29 In an attempt to cir-
cumvent the judiciary's reluctance to permit the introduction of de-
fenses explicitly based upon international law, lawyers and civil re-
sisters have attempted to rely upon the domestic criminal law
defense of necessity.
V. The Necessity Defense
The choice of evils, competing harms or necessity defense exon-
erates those who commit a crime when the criminal act is necessary
to avoid the occurrence of a greater, imminent, and immediate social
harm. The individual is considered to be acting under the pressure of
exigent circumstances and to lack a criminal intent. The law thus
recognizes that it cannot deter criminal conduct under such circum-
stances and to enforce criminal sanctions would bring the law into
disrepute. 3 °
Traditionally, there are four requirements for the necessity
defense:
126. 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970).
127. Id. at 484.
128. People v. Weber, 162 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 6, 208 Cal. Rptr. 719, 722 (1984).
129. In re Weller, 164 Cal. App. 3d 44, 49, 210 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (1985).
130. See generally Luckstead, Choice of Evils Defenses in Texas: Necessity, Duress,
and Public Duty, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 179, 181 (1982).
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(1) the defendant is faced with a clear and imminent danger,
not one which is debatable or speculative; (2) the defendant can
reasonably expect that his action will be effective as the direct
cause of abating the danger; (3) there is no legal alternative
which will be effective in abating the danger; and (4) the Legis-
lature has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and de-
liberate choice regarding the value at issue."'
Those invoking the necessity defense, unlike traditional civil dis-
obedience who admit their guilt, claim that their acts are legally jus-
tified and necessary to halt ongoing violations of international law.
Thus, it is government officials, rather than protesters, who are en-
gaging in criminal activities. 132
Appellate courts uniformally have rejected the necessity defense
in civil resistance cases. Courts have concluded that the harm which
was intended to be prevented by the protesters' was not sufficiently
imminent or immediate to invoke the necessity defense and that the
protesters' acts were not calculated to eliminate the threatened
harm. Courts also have determined that there were available and ef-
fective legal alternatives through which protesters might have uti-
lized to attempt to change the government policies which they
viewed as posing a social harm.'33
In the California case of People v. Weber,134 Judge Milkes
noted that the necessity defense requires a situation of an "emer-
gency nature, that there be threatened physical harm, and that there
was no legal alternative course of action available.' 35 The defend-
ants' contention that it was necessary to trespass and to block side-
walks and streets in front of General Dynamics and a United States
Navy Submarine Base in order to prevent nuclear war was rejected
by the Court as expanding the defense to encompass potential
harms.136 In this situation, Judge Milkes observed, there were other
forms of protest available to the defendants which "disembowel the
defense of necessity.""' Permitting the defense of necessity to be
invoked
would mean that markets may be pillaged because there are
hungry people; hospitals may be plundered for drugs because
there are those in pain; homes may be broken into because there
131. Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 373, 379, 433 N.E.2d 457, 461
(1982).
132. See generally F. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1987).
133. See generally Comment, Political Protest and the Illinois Defense of Necessity, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1070 (1987).
134. 162 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 208 Cal. Rptr. 719.
135. 162 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 5, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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are unfortunately some without shelter; department stores may
be burglarized for guns because there is fear of crime; banks
may be robbed because of unemployment.138
Thus, the necessity defense requires that the defendants' act
constitute an immediate response to an exigent circumstance rather
than a deliberate, reasoned, and calculated choice of alternative
courses of action or strategies.' 39 In addition, the harm to be pre-
vented must be immediate (or physically proximate) and not "only
tenuously connected with the situs of the crime ... "I"
In addition to concluding that the harm protesters sought to
prevent was not imminent, appellate courts have held that protesters'
acts were not sufficiently calculated to eliminate the threatened harm
to satisfy the requirements of the necessity defense. In United States
v. Dorrell,'4' the Court rejected the contention that the defendant's
entry into Vandenburg Air Force Base and the spray-painting of a
missile assembly building "could be reasonably anticipated to lead to
the termination of the MX missile program and the aversion of nu-
clear war and world starvation."' 42 In United States v. Kroncke,143
the defendants attempted to burn draft records in an effort to halt
the Vietnam war and were charged with violating the Selective Ser-
vice Act.""4 The Court ruled that the necessity defense was not ap-
plicable where "the relationship between the defendant's act and the
'good' to be accomplished is as tenuous and uncertain as here."' 45 In
United States v. Simpson,"' which also involved the burning of
draft records, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the Vi-
etnam conflict "could obviously have continued whether or not the
San Jose, California draft board was able to restore its files and con-
tinue its lawful operations.' 47
Courts also have held that defendants had legal mechanisms to
change government policies and it was unnecessary to violate the
law. In Dorrell, 18 the Court held that to permit the defendant to
rely on the necessity defense to justify his criminal protest against
nuclear weapons would amount to "recognizing that an individual
may assert a defense to criminal charges whenever he or she dis-
138. Id.
139. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 325 Pa. Super. Ct. 242, 472 A.2d 1099 (1984), rev'd
and remanded, 509 Pa. 118, 125, 501 A.2d 226, 230 (1985).
140. State v. Marley, 54 Haw. at 472, 409 P.2d at 1109.
141. 758 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1985).
142. Id. at 433.
143. 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972).
144. Id. at 698.
145. Id. at 701.
146. 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972).
147. Id. at 518 n.7.
148. 758 F.2d at 427.
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agrees with a result reached by the political process."149 The Court
noted that "impatience does not constitute the 'necessity' that the
defense of necessity requires."' 50 In United States v. Quilty,'5 the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that there are
"thousands of opportunities for the propagation of the anti-nuclear
message: in the electoral process, by speech on public streets, in
parks, in auditoriums, in churches and lecture halls; and by the re-
lease of information to the media, to name only a few.' 52
Thus, courts have refused to permit the courthouse to be used as
a forum for the articulation of political views. Citizens generally lack
standing to challenge government policies in a civil suit 5 and "they
cannot skirt the standing requirement by intentionally breaking an
unrelated law in order to cast themselves as defendants rather than
plaintiffs.' 5' The resolution of policy disputes must take place
through the democratic process.
One who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into his own
hands thereby demonstrates his conviction that his own ability
to determine policy is superior to democratic decision making.
Appellant's professed unselfish motivation, rather than a justifi-
cation, actually identified a form of arrogance which organized
society cannot tolerate. 55
VI. Necessity and the Defense of Human Rights
Faced with demonstrators' claim of a justification under inter-
national law for their acts of political protest, judges have retreated
into a mechanical application of the necessity defense.55 This for-
malistic approach is reminiscent of the analysis employed by nine-
teenth century judges to justify decisions upholding the institution of
slavery.'57
Judges not only have denied defendants the use of the necessity
defense, but, at times, have also imposed draconian sentences on
protesters seeking to invoke the defense. In United States v.
Kabat, 58 four protesters occupied and vandalized a Minuteman II
intercontinental missile site and were sentenced to terms ranging
from eight to eighteen years in prison plus other penalties.' 59 Judge
149. Id. at 432.
150. Id. at 431.
151. 741 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1984).
152. Id. at 1033.
153. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208(1973).
154. United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 453 (2d Cir. 1985).
155. United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 392 (7th Cir. 1971).
156. 758 F.2d at 436.
157. R. COOVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
158. 797 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1986).
159. Id. at 590, 593.
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Bright, in dissent, 160 noted that although the protest activities did
not injure any persons or property, the sentences "are akin to penal-
ties often imposed on violent criminals, such as robbers and rapists,
or on those guilty of crimes considered heinous, such as drug deal-
ers."' 61 Such harsh sentences, in part, appear to be based on the
judges' belief that these often articulate and educated defendants
only can be deterred through harsh penalties." 2 Even sympathetic
judges have explained that the moral potency of the defendants'
cause and motivation does not "alter the duty" of the courts to en-
force the law."6 3
The judiciary should recognize a public interest necessity de-
fense for those acting in a nonviolent, proportionate fashion to pro-
tect their own or others' internationally guaranteed human rights.
Courts, however, have refused to recognize standing for those who
are unable to assert harm from the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government that is "greater than, or different from, the potential
harm that might affect every other person in the United States."' 64
The defendant must be able to demonstrate some "direct harm to
himself, not a theoretical future harm to all of use that may or may
not occur."'6 5
Individuals around the world, in many cases, face severe repres-
sion if they protest the violation of their rights or lack the resources
or mechanisms to redress their grievances. Others should be privi-
leged to act on behalf of themselves and others to protect human
rights. An analogous argument was made by Justice Douglas in his
dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton.'66 He proposed that standing be
granted to inanimate natural objects about to be "despoiled, defaced
or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of
public outrage."' 7 Those with an intimate relation with the inani-
mate object about to be "injured, polluted, or otherwise despoiled are
its legitimate spokesmen."' 6 The "environmental issues should be
tendered by the inanimate object itself . . . . Those inarticulate
members of the ecological group cannot speak. But those people who
have so frequented the place as to know its values and wonders will
be able to speak for the entire ecological community."'6 9
The judiciary's rigid application of the law of necessity in the
160. Id. at 592.
161. Id. at 594.
162. State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 395 A.2d 858 (1978).
163. 741 F.2d at 1034.
164. United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 1980).
165. Id.
166. 405 U.S 727, 741 (1972).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 745.
169. Id. at 752.
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case of political protest is contrary to the function of the defense and
the flexible fashion in which the defense historically has been ap-
plied. The necessity defense is a "natural right, of which the govern-
ment cannot deprive the citizen . . . .It may be exercised by a sin-
gle individual . ..or by a community of individuals in defense of
their common safety or in the protection of their common rights."17
The exercise of this right of necessity is not susceptible of "[v]ery
precise definition, for the mode and manner and extent of its exercise
must depend upon the nature and degree of necessity that calls it
into action, and this cannot be determined, until the necessity is
made to appear." 171 Thus, the judiciary is in error when it fails to
adjust the requirements of the necessity defense to accommodate the
claims of political protesters. As observed in State v. Wooton, l7 z
each case "must necessarily stand upon its own facts, and as no two
cases are exactly alike, necessarily as each arises the application
must be made according to the nature of the situation presented." 7 '
Strictly speaking, it is never necessary for an individual to
act-they can always merely suffer the consequences of inaction. 74
The law of necessity, at least in cases involving nonviolent protests
against the violation of human rights, should be viewed as an implied
exception to the rule of law which permits an individual deliberately
to violate the law and then submit the moral justification for their
action to a jury of their peers. 75 Glanville Williams comments that
the "language of necessity disguises the selection of values that is
really involved."17 " It also is "clear that the necessity defense applies
to a defendant who commits a crime in an effort to rescue or protect
an unrelated third person or persons. ' 77
The necessity defense specifically has been recognized as a justi-
fication for an act of rebellion. In 1834, Justice Story ruled that
sailors had a right under maritime law to resist their commanding
officer's order to proceed into a storm. 178 Story ruled that in such a
case, the law deems "the lives of all persons far more valuable than
property."179 It is "clear, that the crew had a right to resist, and to
170. Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 324 Pa. Super. Ct. 61, 68-9, 471 A.2d 462, 465
(1984), reversed and remanded, 508 Pa. 372, 498 A.2d 86 (1985) (quoting Hale v. Lawrence,
21 N.J.L. 714 (1848), affid sub nom. American Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 290(1851)).
171. Id.
172. State v. Wooten, No. 2685 (D. Ariz. filed Sept. 13, 1919) (quoted in Comment,
The Law of Necessity as Applied in the Bisbee Deportation Case, 2 ARIz. L. REV. 264
(1961)).
173. Id. at 272-73.
174. Williams, The Defense of Necessity, 6 CURRENT LEGAL PROBs. 216, 223 (1953).
175. Id. at 224.
176. Id.
177. United States v. Lopez, 662 F. Supp. 1083, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
178. United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873, 874 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14,470).
179. Id.
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refuse obedience. It is a case of justifiable self-defense against an
undue exercise of power."' 0 While the dictates of a commanding
officer are to be obeyed, the crew is not obligated to proceed merely
because the officer exercises a "rashness of judgment to proceed."' 81
VII. A Public Interest Necessity Defense
There should be a recognition of a public interest necessity de-
fense for those acting in a nonviolent, proportionate fashion to pro-
tect the rights of other human beings. The importance of human
rights and the severity of the harm inflicted on those who are de-
prived of their rights justifies a relaxation of the immediacy require-
ments. A modification in the immediacy requirement, however, has
been rejected as leading to the creation of a "vigilante society."' 2
However, those acting to halt human rights violations, in reality, are
acting to uphold, rather than abrogate, the rule of law. In the case of
distant and complex human rights violations it clearly is impossible
to satisfy the immediacy requirement. It should be sufficient that an
individual directs their acts against a site which is symbolically rep-
resentative of the harm they seek to alleviate.
Satisfying the imminency requirement does not pose a problem
in the case of ongoing human rights violations or where such viola-
tions are reasonably likely to occur. In other cases, such as a protest
directed against the selling of riot control equipment to a repressive
regime which is confronted with internal unrest, the imminency re-
quirement should be viewed as a loose threshold requirement. The
jury would be asked to evaluate the justifiability of the defendant's
actions in light of the severity and the general foreseeability of the
harm which the defendant sought to prevent or to remedy.
The requirement that the defendant's act be calculated to allevi-
ate the threatened harm also should be flexibly interpreted. Acts of
civil resistance not only are a device for forcing courts to conduct a
legal referendum on the justifiability of the defendant's actions and
for educating the public, but also serve to mobilize others to follow
their example. Courts have ruled that acts designed to impact public
consciousness are not sufficiently directed to alleviate a harm to sat-
isfy the nexus requirement of the necessity defense. 183 However, acts
of civil protest historically have influenced public opinion, mobilized
mass movements, and resulted in social change. 8 Judge Spaeth in a
concurring opinion in a nuclear protest case pointed out that:"8 5
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 54 Haw. at 471, 509 P.2d at 1108.
183. Commonwealth v. Averill, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 262, 423 N.E.2d 6, 7-8 (1981).
184. 797 F.2d at 601 (Bright, J., dissenting).
185. 325 Pa. Super. Ct. at 272, 472 A.2d at 1114 (emphasis in original).
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[a]ppellants do not assert that their action would avoid nuclear
war (what a grandiose and unlikely idea!). Instead, at least so
far as I can tell from the record, their belief was that their ac-
tion, in combination with the actions of others, might accelerate
a political process ultimately leading to the abandonment of nu-
clear missiles. And that belief, I submit, should not be dismissed
as "unreasonable as a matter of law." A jury might-or might
not-find it unreasonable as a matter of fact. But that is for a
jury to say, not for a court.' 86
Courts also have insisted that defendants demonstrate that they
have exhausted all reasonable alternatives. 87 It should only be re-
quired that defendants have made a good faith effort to alleviate the
harm prior to resorting to a violation of the criminal law. As pres-
ently applied, the judiciary has effectively eliminated the use of the
necessity defense in prosecutions stemming from political protests by
mechanically reminding defendants that democratic options are
available. 88 Of course, such options often are time-consuming, re-
quire resources, may be ineffective, and may not engender a suffi-
ciently swift response to alleviate human suffering.' 8"
The Griffin v. United States'" decision illustrates how the ex-
haustion requirement may impose an unreasonable burden on de-
fendants seeking to alleviate an immediate social harm. In Griffin,"'
the defendants, who had an extensive history of efforts on behalf of
the homeless, illegally entered two Washington D.C. cathedrals with
the intent of opening the doors to the homeless." 2 The Court ob-
served that the defendants had failed to demonstrate that they had
exhausted all other legal alternatives, such as the availability of
other churches, civil buildings and private residences and "on the
night in question, appellants, after having checked out all other shel-
ters, had no other choice but to open up the two cathedrals.""13 The
difficulty, of course, is that the exhaustion requirement is virtually
impossible to satisfy since there are an infinite variety of legal alter-
natives available to an individual; and a court can dismiss an individ-
ual's lack of success as indicating that [sihe simply did not put forth
sufficient effort, or that the individual's claims are contrary to the
prevailing democratic consensus.""
186. 325 Pa. Super. Ct. at 274, 472 A.2d at 1115 (emphasis in original).
187. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980).
188. United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1972).
189. See generally Levitin, Putting the Government on Trial: The Necessity Defense
and Social Change, WAYNE L. REV. 1221, 1233 (1989).
190. 447 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 777.
193. Id. at 778.
194. See 324 Pa. Super. Ct. at 75, 471 A.2d at 469.
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By refusing to permit defendants to introduce evidence to sup-
port the necessity defense, courts are denying defendants the oppor-
tunity to have the justifiability of their actions evaluated by a jury of
their peers. In United States v. Bailey,'95 Justice Blackmun noted in
his dissent 96 that:
[r]uling on a defense as a matter of law and preventing the jury
from considering it should be a rare occurrence in criminal cases
... .The jury is the conscience of society and its role in a
criminal prosecution if particularly important . . . .The case
for recognizing the duress or necessity defenses is even more
compelling when it is society, rather than private actors, that
creates the coercive conditions. In such a situation it is espe-
cially appropriate that the jury be permitted to weigh all the
factors and strike the balance between the interests of prisoners
and that of society. In an attempt to conserve the jury for cases
it considers truly worthy of that body, the Court has ousted the
jury from a role it is particularly well suited to serve.'9'
Considering the fact that courts have liberally interpreted the neces-
sity defense to permit farmers to protect the livelihood of their live-
stock, they should do no less for those acting on behalf of human
rights.'98
VIII. Conclusion
Numerous volumes have documented the precariousness of the
global community-nuclear war, ecological disaster, the violation of
human rights, and economic underdevelopment are only some of the
threats which confront the world as it moves toward the year
2000.111 Richard Falk writes that while the seriousness of the human
situation increases almost daily, the period of time available to rem-
edy the situation is being "steadily shortened."200
The destructive forces and institutions which helped to create
and to perpetuate this crisis can be partially limited and controlled
through a vigorous transnational citizens movement which acts to
combat injustice. The recognition of a domestic and international
right of civil resistance in defense of human rights is an important
step in the creation of a vigorous citizenry. No state has the preroga-
tive to punish those who act in a nonviolent, proportionate fashion to
195. 444 U.S. at 394.
196. Id. at 419.
197. Id. at 435.
198. Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398 (1873); Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1962).
199. See generally WINNING THE HUMAN RACE? THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, supra note 28.
200. R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR HUMAN
SURVIVAL 354 (1971).
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protect the inherent and inalienable rights of any members of the
human family. In an era in which States have disregarded the re-
quirements of international law, it is hypocritical to deny protection
to those who are acting in the nature of private attorneys general to
vindicate human rights.
Allegiance to the Nation-State must be replaced by a loyalty to
the human community and by a respect for international law. It is
not the rebel who threatens civilization, but the compliant conform-
ist. Stanley Milgram writes that most people blindly follow the dic-
tates of their institutional superiors and easily suppress-the notion
that their conduct should be guided by moral ideals.2"' This is "a
fatal flaw . . . which in the long run gives our species only a modest
chance of survival. °2 0 2 The virtues of loyalty, discipline and self-sac-
rifice which are so highly valued, in Milgram's opinion, are the "very
properties that create destructive organizational engines of war and
bind men to malevolent systems of authority." ' 3 He sadly concludes
that the type of character produced in American democratic society
"*cannot be counted on to insulate its citizens from brutality and in-
humane treatment at the direction of malevolent authority."204
Those who act in a nonviolent proportionate fashion to protect inter-
nationally guaranteed human rights must be recognized as heroes
who are to be emulated rather than as criminals who are to be
confined.
201. S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 188 (1969).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 189.
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